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SENDING NOTICE TO POTENTIAL PLAINTIFFS IN CLASS
ACTIONS UNDER THE AGE DISCRIMINATION
IN EMPLOYMENT ACT: THE TRIAL
COURT'S ROLE
INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA
or Act)' to protect the employment rights of older workers by promoting
employment based on ability and prohibiting discrimination based on
age.2 The ADEA incorporates section 216(b) of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act (FLSA),3 which grants an employee the right to sue on behalf
of himself or on behalf of other, similarly situated employees.4 ADEA
1. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81
Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982)).
2. See id. § 621. The ADEA prohibits employers from discriminating against em-
ployees aged 40 to 70, see id § 631(a), in hiring, discharge, employment terms and other
factors that might deprive one of employment opportunities, see id. § 623(a). Employ-
ment agencies and labor organizations are also prohibited from discriminating activities.
Id. § 623(b), (c).
Congress also sought to "help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems
arising from the impact of age on employment." Id. § 621(b). Thus, the Act provides for
education and research programs, see id. § 622, and requires conciliatory attempts by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) before plaintiffs institute litiga-
tion, see id. § 626(b).
3. See id. § 626(b). Section 216(c) provides for public suits by the Secretary of La-
bor. Id. § 216(c). For ADEA purposes, this function was transferred in 1978 to the
EEOC. See Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1978, § 2, 43 F.R. 19,807 (1978), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
app. at 1155 (1982), and in 92 Stat. 3781 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 626(a)-(c)
(1982)).
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982)), a cornerstone of the New Deal, see Forsythe,
Legislative History qf the Fair Labor Standards Act, 6 Law & Contemp. Probs. 464, 464-
66 (1939), was designed to "promote economic justice and security for the lowest paid
. . . wage earners, to create conditions of employment stability, and to eliminate unfair
competitive labor practices in industry." S. Rep. No. 640, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1, re-
printed in 1949 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 2241, 2241. The Act provides for minimum wages
and overtime pay. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982). For background on the FLSA, see
Dodd, The Supreme Court and Fair Labor Standards, 1941-1945, 59 Harv. L Rev. 321
(1946); Forsythe, supra.
4. Section 216(b) reads, in pertinent part:
Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section 207 of
this title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of
their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the
case may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. Any
employer who violates the provisions of section 215(a)(3) of this title shall be
liable for such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the
purposes of section 215(a)(3) of this title, including without limitation employ-
ment, reinstatement, promotion and the payment of wages lost and an addi-
tional equal amount as liquidated damages. An action to recover the liability
prescribed in either of the preceding sentences may be maintained against any
employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State court of competent
jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or them-
selves and other employees similarly situated. No employee shall be a party plain-
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class actions have helped the ADEA become an important means for
protecting older workers' rights.' Aggregating claims under section
216(b) is imperative for the viability of private actions under the Act
because of the large costs and small awards in ADEA suits. 6 Yet restric-
tive interpretations of section 216(b) threaten its continued effectiveness.7
In many class actions brought under the ADEA, the plaintiffs' attor-
ney tries to contact potential class members.8 The attorney often asks
the court to compel discovery of the names and addresses of employees
"similarly situated" to the plaintiffs. Then, fearing that communication
with potential plaintiffs might be deemed unlawful client solicitation
under state laws,9 the lawyer asks the court to send or authorize the
tiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a
party and such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought. The
court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff
or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and
costs of the action.
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982) (emphasis added).
This language is often used to describe the class action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory
committee note ("Subdivision (b)(3) encompasses those cases in which a class action
would achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision
as to persons similarly situated .. "); I J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence 448 (4th ed.
1918) (using phrase "on behalf. . . of others similarly situated" to describe a pre-Rule 23
version of the class action); Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the
Class Suit, 8 U. Chi. L. Rev. 684, 712 (1941) (quoting Linden Land Co. v. Milwaukee
Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 107 Wis. 493, 496, 83 N.W. 851, 852 (1900) (referring to class
actions brought by similarly situated plaintiffs)); Moore & Cohen, Federal Class Actions,
32 Ill. L. Rev. 307, 318 (1937) (in the spurious suit of Rule 23, plaintiffs sue on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated). Although the term "class action" appears no-
where in § 216(b), the group suit under that section is always referred to as a class action.
See, e.g., McKenna v. Champion Int'l Corp., 747 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1984); Woods
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 686 F.2d 578, 580 (7th Cir. 1982); Kinney Shoe Corp. v.
Vorhes, 564 F.2d 859, 861 (9th Cir. 1977). Moreover, when a single plaintiff brings an
action on behalf of other employees similarly situated and files notice of intent to sue with
the EEOC, as required by 29 U.S.C. § 626(d), the time period for the similarly situated
plaintiffs to sue is tolled. See Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 588, 593-94 (10th Cir.
1980); Bean v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 600 F.2d 754, 759 (9th Cir. 1979).
5. See Spahn, Resurrecting the Spurious Class: Opting-In to the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act and the Equal Pay Act through the Fair Labor Standards Act, 71 Geo.
L.J. 119, 121 (1982); see also Schuster & Miller, An Empirical Assessment of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 38 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 64, 70 (1984) (private
suits comprised 73% of all suits brought under ADEA up until 1981).
6. This is because ADEA suits are expensive to bring, see Schuster & Miller, supra
note 5, at 70, and the recoveries are limited, see Vazquez v. Eastern Air Lines, 579 F.2d
107, 111 (1st Cir. 1978). See infra note 119.
7. See Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 99 F.R.D. 89, 93 (D.N.J. 1983), appeal dismissed,
747 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1984); Spahn, supra note 5, at 156-57.
8. See, e.g., McKenna v. Champion Int'l Corp., 747 F.2d 1211,1211 (8th Cir. 1984);
Woods v. New York Life Ins. Co., 686 F.2d 578, 579 (7th Cir. 1982); Vivone v. Acme
Mkts., Inc., 105 F.R.D. 65, 66 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Owens v. Bethlehem Mines Corp., 108
F.R.D. 207, 214 (S.D. W. Va. 1985).
9. Some states have held that letters sent from attorneys to potential clients violate
state laws against solicitation, even if those letters are not misleading or fraudulent. See
State v. Moses, 231 Kan. 243, 243-46, 642 P.2d 1004, 1004-07 (1982) (mass mailing with
general information concerning attorney's real estate expertise punishable as solicitation);
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notice.10
Dayton Bar Ass'n v. Herzog, 70 Ohio St. 2d 261, 263 & note, 436 N.E.2d 1037, 1038 &
note (mass mailing with information about federal statute similar to in-person solicitation
and thus held punishable), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1016 (1982). But see In re Von Wiegen,
63 N.Y.2d 163, 166, 170, 470 N.E.2d 838, 839, 841, 481 N.Y.S.2d 40, 41, 43 (1984)
(letters sent to victims of Hyatt Regency skywalk disaster did not pose problems of in-
person solicitation and were thus not punishable), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2701 (1985).
Although the Supreme Court has held that the states may not ban outright non-mislead-
ing lawyer mailings of a general nature, see In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 206-07 (1982),
attorney-sent notice could be distinguished on the ground that it is sent to a particular
person concerning a particular case and is thus punishable. See McKenna v. Champion
Int'l Corp., 747 F.2d 1211, 1216 n.7 (8th Cir. 1984). This Note argues that a blanket ban
on attorney-sent notice violates the first amendment. See infra notes 122-57 and accom-
panying text.
10. See McKenna v. Champion Int'l Corp., 747 F.2d 1211, 1211-12 (8th Cir. 1984)
(plaintiffs' motion for court-issued notice is denied and plaintiffs are forbidden from com-
municating on their own); Woods v. New York Life Ins. Co., 686 F.2d 578, 579-80 (7th
Cir. 1982) (plaintiffs request court-issued notice; court supervises but does not send notice
on its letterhead); Vivone v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 105 F.R.D. 65, 66, 68 (E.D. Pa. 1985)
(plaintiffs' motion for discovery of names and addresses is granted); Owens v. Bethlehem
Mines Corp., 108 F.R.D. 207, 216-17 (S.D. W. Va. 1985) (plaintiffs' request for court
authorization of notice is denied); Behr v. Drake Hotel, 586 F. Supp. 427, 430, 432 (N.D.
Ill. 1984) (plaintiffs' request for court approval of notice and discovery of list of present
and former employees is granted); Allen v. Marshall Field & Co., 93 F.R.D. 438, 440,
442 (N.D. III. 1982) (court supervises notice form pursuant to plaintiffs' request for court
authorization); Johnson v. American Airlines, 531 F. Supp. 957, 958 (N.D. Tex. 1982)
(court grants motion for authorization and discovery of names and addresses of potential
plaintiffs); Frank v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc., 88 F.R.D. 674, 675-76
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (request for court authorization of notice and compelled discovery of
potential plaintiffs' names and addresses is granted); Monroe v. United Air Lines, 90
F.R.D. 638, 640 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (court grants leave to send notice and grants motion
requesting compelled discovery of names, addresses and dates of birth of potential plain-
tiffs); Geller v. Markham, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1622, 1624 (D. Conn. 1979)
(court grants motion for court authorization of notice and compels discovery of names
and addresses), ajfd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981); Montalto v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 83 F.R.D.
150, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (motion for discovery of names of potential plaintiffs is denied);
Wagner v. Loew's Theatres, Inc., 76 F.R.D. 23, 24, 25 (M.D.N.C. 1977) (plaintiffs' re-
quest for court supervision of notice is denied); Roshto v. Chrysler Corp., 67 F.R.D. 28,
28, 30 (E.D. La. 1975) (plaintiffs' request for "right to notify" potential plaintiffs denied).
Similar procedures are followed in other § 216(b) class actions. See, eg., Dolan v.
Project Constr. Corp., 725 F.2d 1263, 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1984) (affirming grant of
protective order regarding discovery of names, addresses and particulars of employment
of employees and denying plaintiffs' motion for court-authorized notice in FLSA action);
Braunstein v. Eastern Photographic Laboratories, Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir. 1978)
(per curiam) (affirming grant of motion for court authorization of notice in FLSA ac-
tion), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 944 (1979); Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes, 564 F.2d 859, 860,
864 (9th Cir. 1977) (reversing district court, which permitted notice sent by plaintiffs
themselves, and vacating grant of plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery of names and
addresses of potential plaintiffs in FLSA action); Pirrone v. North Hotel Assocs., 108
F.R.D. 78, 81-82, 85 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (motion for discovery of employees' names and
addresses solely to aid notice in FLSA action granted); Goerke v. Commercial Contrac-
tors & Supply Co., 600 F. Supp. 1155, 1156-57, 1161 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (denying plaintiffs'
motion for discovery of names and addresses and court-approved notice to potential
plaintiffs in FLSA action). The difference between court authorization and court issu-
ance is inconsequential when considered from the viewpoint of plaintiffs' lawyers. The
lawyer's interest is in lessening the likelihood of punishment for client solicitation. See
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In deciding whether to send or authorize notice, trial courts determine
if they have the power to do so'" by deciding whether sending or author-
izing notice comports with the proper role of the judiciary 2 and by ex-
amining the extent of Congress' implicit or explicit mandate for such
conduct.13
Some courts have asserted that a court role in sending notice to poten-
tial plaintiffs is nonjudicial and therefore can be justified only by express
legislative mandate or if due process requires it.14 Although Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has been held not to govern ADEA
class actions under section 216(b),15 these courts insist on viewing section
Woods v. New York Life Ins. Co., 686 F.2d 578, 581 (7th Cir. 1982). A court, however,
may find it less taxing for plaintiffs' attorneys to send notice, if the court decides that
notice is appropriate. Cf 7A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 1788, at 166-67 (1972) (in Rule 23 actions, court usually supervises notice but has
plaintiffs' counsel send it). Usually, the court has plaintiffs and defendant submit sug-
gested notice forms, or asks defendant to object to plaintiffs' proposed form. The court
modifies the form if it deems it necessary. See, e.g., Johnson v. American Airlines, 531 F.
Supp. 957, 966-67 (N.D. Tex. 1982); Allen v. Marshall Field & Co., 93 F.R.D. 438, 446,
449-50 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
11. In determining the power issue, the courts have generally not distinguished be-
tween court-supervised, court-authorized or court-issued notice. The disputed issue is
judicial involvement, not its precise nature. See Goerke v. Commercial Contractors &
Supply Co., 600 F. Supp. 1155, 1160 n.5 (N.D. Ga. 1984). Apparently, courts tacitly
assume that if they have the power to aid notice, they have the discretion to decide how
to exercise it. Cf Woods v. New York Life Ins. Co., 686 F.2d 578, 582 (7th Cir. 1982)
(Eschbach, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (district court should be allowed
the discretion to determine format of notice). Such an assumption conforms with the
court's discretion in determining how best to send notice in Rule 23 actions. See 7A C.
Wright & A. Miller, supra note 10, § 1788, at 170.
In Woods v. New York Life Ins. Co., 686 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1982), however, Judge
Posner opined that although the trial court has the power to supervise notice, the judge
does not have the power to "issue a judicial invitation to join a lawsuit" by affixing his
signature to notice on court letterhead. See id. at 581-82. This distinction relies on the
assumption that the recipient of notice will interpret a judge's signature or court letter-
head as endorsement of the merits of the action. See id. at 581. However, the notice
presumably contemplated by the Woods court as within judicial power, like notice au-
thorized by other courts, should contain the name of the judge and the court's address so
that the recipient can opt in. See, e.g., Johnson v. American Airlines, 531 F. Supp. 957,
966-67 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (notice contained name of judge and told recipient to opt in by
filing with the clerk of the court). This might just as easily be misinterpreted as court
endorsement. Moreover, by facilitating notice, the court is indeed issuing a judicial invi-
tation to the lawsuit. See infra notes 110-14 and accompanying text. Disputes over sta-
tionery merely elevate form over substance. See Goerke v. Commercial Contractors &
Supply Co., 600 F. Supp. 1155, 1160 n.5 (N.D. Ga. 1984). See infra notes 22-24.
12. See, e.g., Woods v. New York Life Ins. Co., 686 F.2d 578, 581-82 (7th Cir. 1982);
Roshto v. Chrysler Corp., 67 F.R.D. 28, 30 (E.D. La. 1975).
13. See Monroe v. United Air Lines, 90 F.R.D. 638, 639 (N.D. Ill. 1981); see, e.g.,
Baker v. Michie Co., 93 F.R.D. 494, 495 (W.D. Va. 1982).
14. See, e.g., McKenna v. Champion Int'l Corp., 747 F.2d 1211, 1213-14 (8th Cir.
1984); Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes, 564 F.2d 859, 863 (9th Cir. 1977); Goerke v. Com-
mercial Contractors & Supply Co., 600 F. Supp. 1155, 1159 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Baker v.
Michie Co., 93 F.R.D. 494, 495 (W.D. Va. 1982).
15. Courts of appeals have held Rule 23 inapplicable to § 216(b) suits, whether under
the ADEA, Equal Pay Act or FLSA. See MeKenna v. Champion Int'l Corp., 747 F.2d
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216(b) class actions in light of the class action under Rule 23(b)(3). They
point out that under Rule 23(b)(3) class members are bound by a court's
judgment unless they opt out.' 6 These courts view the compulsory notice
provision found in Rule 23(c)(2), which applies to Rule 23(b)(3) suits, as
required because a denial of due process results if class members are
bound by a judgment of which they had no knowledge."7 Comparing
Rule 23(b)(3) with section 216(b), it is noted that such a denial of due
process does not occur in the section 216(b) class action, since section
1211, 1213 (8th Cir. 1984) (ADEA); Dolan v. Project Constr. Corp., 725 F.2d 1263, 1266
(10th Cir. 1984) (FLSA); Haynes v. Singer Co., 696 F.2d 884, 886 (11th Cir. 1983)
(FLSA); Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes, 564 F.2d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 1977) (FLSA);
LaChapelle v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 513 F.2d 286, 289 (5th Cir. 1975) (ADEA); see also
Braunstein v. Eastern Photographic Laboratories, Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 335-36 (2d Cir.
1978) (per curiam) (granting a motion to send notice to potential plaintiffs in an FLSA
suit by considering only § 216(b) and not mentioning Rule 23), cert denied, 441 U.S. 944
(1979). Although the Third, Fourth and District of Columbia Circuits have not decided
the issue, see Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 747 F.2d 174, 176 (3d Cir. 1984); Thompson v.
Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 270 & n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1982), district courts within those circuits
have held that Rule 23 does not apply. See, e.g., Vivone v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 105 F.R.D.
65, 66 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Held v. National R. Passenger Corp., 101 F.R.D. 420, 421
(D.D.C. 1984); Baker v. Michie Co., 93 F.R.D. 494, 496-97 (W.D. Va. 1982); Wagner v.
Loew's Theatres, Inc., 76 F.R.D. 23, 24 (M.D.N.C. 1977). But see Geller v. Markham,
19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1622, 1623 (D. Conn. 1979) (viewing section 216(b)
class action through the framework of Rule 23), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other
grounds, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980), cert denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981).
Prior to LaChapelle v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 513 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1975), several dis-
trict courts applied Rule 23 standards to § 216(b) class actions. See Blankenship v. Ral-
ston Purina Co., 62 F.R.D. 35, 37-43 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Townsend v. Treadway, 22 Wage
& Hour Cas. (BNA) 12, 15 (M.D. Tenn. 1973); Bradford v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 60
F.R D. 432, 440-41 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Gebhard v. GAF Corp., 59 F.R.D. 504, 507-08
(D.D.C. 1973); Bishop v. JelleffAssocs., Inc., 4 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1262, 1262-
63 (D.D.C. 1972); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 321 F. Supp. 1041, 1042-43 (D.D.C.
1971).
Section 216(b) also applies to actions under the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA), Pub. L.
No. 88-38, § 3, 77 Stat. 56-57 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982)); see
Jackson v. University of Pittsburgh, 405 F. Supp. 607, 611-12 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (EPA
class action should be brought under § 216(b) of FLSA).
In deciding the trial court's role in sending notice to potential ADEA plaintiffs, courts
base their discussion, in part, on FLSA and EPA cases brought under § 216(b). Goerke
v. Commercial Contractors & Supply Co., 600 F. Supp. 1155, 1158-59 n.4 (N.D. Ga.
1984); see Woods v. New York Life Ins. Co., 686 F.2d 578, 580 (7th Cir. 1982) (citing
Braunstein v. Eastern Photographic Laboratories, Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir. 1978)
(per curiam), cert denied, 441 U.S. 944 (1979), as applicable to the ADEA case before
the court). Such cases are therefore relevant to the issues raised in this Note. However,
the particular policies and procedures of the FLSA and EPA distinct from those related
to § 216(b) are beyond the scope of this Note.
16. See McKenna v. Champion Int'l Corp., 747 F.2d 1211, 1213 (8th Cir. 1984) (dis-
cussing Rule 23(c)(2), which applies only in Rule 23(b)(3) actions); Kinney Shoe Corp. v.
Vorhes, 564 F.2d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 1977); Goerke v. Commercial Contractors & Supply
Co., 600 F. Supp. 1155, 1159 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Baker v. Michie Co., 93 F.R.D. 494, 496
(W.D. Va. 1982).
17. See McKenna v. Champion Int'l Corp., 747 F.2d 1211, 1213 (8th Cir. 1984);
Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes, 564 F.2d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 1977); Goerke v. Commercial
Contractors & Supply Co., 600 F. Supp. 1155, 1159 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
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216(b) plaintiffs must opt in to be bound by a judgment.' 8 Concluding
that due process does not require notice in section 216(b) actions and
reading Congress' silence concerning notice as an absence of the purport-
edly requisite legislative sanction, these courts hold the trial court with-
out power to send or authorize notice to potential plaintiffs.' 9
Other courts view notice as one of the many procedures a trial court
may use without any legislative directive. Finding that notice helps to
effectuate the broad remedial purposes of the ADEA and to conserve
judicial resources, these courts uphold the trial court's power to act.20
Apart from the question of power, some courts state that undesirable
consequences of notice-stirring up litigation and solicitation of claims-
require the court both to abstain from exercising its power and to forbid
the plaintiffs' attorney from contacting potential plaintiffs.2' Other
courts agree that the trial court should refrain from an affirmative role
but hold that the court may not unduly restrict the plaintiffs' attorney
from communicating with potential plaintiffs.22 Finally, a third view
holds that these purportedly undesirable factors are insufficient to justify
a court's abstention from an affirmative role where it will effectuate con-
23gressional purposes.
Part I of this Note discusses the trial court's power to authorize and
supervise notice and concludes that a trial court does not transcend its
role when it sends or authorizes notice to potential plaintiffs. Part I fur-
ther contends that Congress, through the ADEA and the statutes it in-
corporates, has not restricted that role. Instead, by providing the ADEA
with section 216(b)'s class action procedure, Congress sanctioned the ju-
18. See McKenna v. Champion Int'l Corp., 747 F.2d 1211, 1213 (8th Cir. 1984);
Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes, 564 F.2d 859, 862-64 (9th Cir. 1977); Goerke v. Commer-
cial Contractors & Supply Co., 600 F. Supp. 1155, 1159 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Baker v.
Michie Co., 93 F.R.D. 494, 496 (W.D. Va. 1982).
19. See McKenna v. Champion Int'l Corp., 747 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1984);
Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes, 564 F.2d 859, 863-64 (9th Cir. 1977); Goerke v. Commer-
cial Contractors & Supply Co., 600 F. Supp. 1155, 1161 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
20. See Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 99 F.R.D. 89, 93 (D.N.J. 1983), appeal dismissed,
747 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1984); Johnson v. American Airlines, 531 F. Supp. 957, 960-61
(N.D. Tex. 1982); Allen v. Marshall Field & Co., 93 F.R.D. 438, 442 (N.D. I11. 1982);
Frank v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc., 88 F.R.D. 674, 675-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
21. McKenna v. Champion Int'l Corp., 747 F.2d 1211, 1214-17 (8th Cir. 1984); see
also Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes, 564 F.2d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 1977) (reversing lower
court's grant of permission to contact potential plaintiffs).
22. Dolan v. Project Constr. Corp., 725 F.2d 1263, 1268 (10th Cir. 1984); Owens v.
Bethlehem Mines Corp., 108 F.R.D. 207, 216-17 (S.D. W. Va. 1985); Goerke v. Commer-
cial Contractors & Supply Co., 600 F. Supp. 1155, 1161 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
23. Pirrone v. North Hotel Assocs., 108 F.R.D. 78, 82 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Johnson v.
American Airlines, 531 F. Supp. 957, 959-60 (N.D. Tex. 1982); Frank v. Capital Cities
Communications, Inc., 88 F.R.D. 674, 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Similar analysis is found in
FLSA cases under § 216(b). See Braunstein v. Eastern Photographic Laboratories, Inc.,
600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir. 1978) (per curiam), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 944 (1979); Soler v.
G & U, Inc., 86 F.R.D. 524, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Riojas v. Seal Produce, Inc., 82
F.R.D. 613, 617-18 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
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diciary's invocation of policies justifying its involvement in sending
notice.
Part II of this Note determines that what some courts assert to be
undesirable consequences of notice are not sufficiently serious to justify
either prohibiting communications by attorneys with potential plaintiffs
or a court's abstaining from sending or authorizing notice. It concludes
that court involvement in sending notice will help advance the purposes
of the ADEA and minimize the chance for undesirable attorney conduct
in the notice procedure.
I. THE POWER OF THE TRIAL COURT TO SEND
OR AUTHORIZE NOTICE
The power of the trial court to send or authorize notice to potential
plaintiffs depends on whether such conduct comports with the appropri-
ate role of a trial court, and the degree to which Congress has sanctioned
court involvement.24 Congress has not explicitly granted or denied such
power in section 216(b) actions.25 The court's power to send or author-
ize notice therefore depends on whether congressional authorization is
necessary, 26 and on whether one should read the ADEA, FLSA and Por-
tal-to-Portal Act (PPA) 7 as approval or disapproval of a court role.
A. Does Court Involvement in Sending Notice Comport with the
Proper Role of the Trial Court?
The propriety of the court's role in giving notice must be viewed in
light of judicial customs and practices, which define the scope of a court's
role. 8 Courts therefore examine the act of sending or authorizing notice
24. See Woods v. New York Life Ins. Co., 686 F.2d 578, 581-82 (7th Cir. 1982); see
also Pan Am. World Airways v. United States Dist. Court, 523 F.2d 1073, 1077-79 & n.3
(9th Cir. 1975) (because notice is contrary to the judiciary's power, it requires express
congressional sanction).
25. See Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 99 F.R.D. 89, 93 (D.NJ. 1983) (Congress silent on
issue of notice in § 216(b) class actions), appeal dismissed, 747 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1984);
Monroe v. United Air Lines, 90 F.R.D. 638, 639 & n.3 (N.D. I11. 1981) (no explicit
provision referring to notice).
Congress can explicitly provide for court involvement in sending notice, as it has under
Rule 23, see Fed. R Civ. P. 23(c)(2). It could also explicitly prohibit court involvement.
See Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1015, 1021 n.19 (1982)
(Congress may withdraw the power to make federal rules).
26. Another way to determine whether congressional mandate is necessary is through
the concept of the inherent powers of a court. When a court has inherent power to
engage in particular conduct, it needs no congressional mandate. See infra note 49.
27. Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, ch. 52, 61 Stat. 84 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 251-262 (1982)). The PPA amended § 216(b) of the FLSA. See infra notes 92-93 and
accompanying text.
28. See State ex rel. Ellis v. Thorne, 112 Wis. 81, 87, 87 N.W. 797, 799 (1901) (judi-
cial power is that power historically exercised); Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress
Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separa-
tion of Powers, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1010, 1017 (1924) (judicial power defined as the sum of
historical exercises of power and ongoing court activities that must adapt to justice's
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and the justifications for that act.29
1. Court-Sent or Authorized Notice: A Nonjudicial Act?
Some courts argue that court involvement in sending notice alters the
proper character of the judge and the court.30 According to this view, by
informing persons of their rights and inviting them to a suit, a court
transcends its traditionally passive role, engaging in conduct appropriate
only for the parties.3
The modem trial judge, however, commonly plays an active role in a
lawsuit. 2 For example, in class actions, the judge functions as a man-
ager of the case, guarding the rights of class members who are not before
the court.33 Conserving judicial resources may demand conduct imping-
changing demands); Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 Harv. L.
Rev. 1281, 1302-03 (1952) (procedural law depends on judicial custom; the trial judge's
role may be mere "patterns of behavior").
29. Considering the difficulty of defining the scope of judicial power, see Chayes, The
Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281, 1307 (1976) (judges
exercise "messy admixture of powers"); Kaufman, The Essence of Judicial Independence,
80 Colum. L. Rev. 671, 689 (1980) (no cases explicitly define the scope of judicial power),
it is remarkable that some courts have characterized notice to potential plaintiffs as be-
yond the judiciary's scope in such terse and conclusory terms. See, e.g., Baker v. Michie
Co., 93 F.R.D. 494, 495 (W.D. Va. 1982) (if no due process problem or express statutory
mandate, court lacks power); Roshto v. Chrysler Corp., 67 F.R.D. 28, 30 (E.D. La. 1975)
(refusing to permit notice conforms to the court's proper role and our legal heritage).
30. See Goerke v. Commercial Contractors & Supply Co., 600 F. Supp. 1155, 1160
(N.D. Ga. 1984) (court supervision or authorization of notice transforms character of
judge) (quoting Woods v. New York Life Ins. Co., 686 F.2d 578, 581-82 (7th Cir. 1982)).
The Woods court rejected only notice on court letterhead or with the judge's signature.
See Woods, 686 F.2d at 581-82. The Goerke court applied the Woods rationale to reject
any court involvement. See Goerke, 600 F. Supp. at 1160; see also Cherner v. Transitron
Elec. Corp., 201 F. Supp. 934, 937 (D. Mass. 1962) (sending notice would transform
court into a social agency).
31. See Dolan v. Project Constr. Corp., 725 F.2d 1263, 1268-69 (10th Cir. 1984) (role
of court should be passive; helping to contact potential plaintiffs transcends that role);
Woods v. New York Life Ins. Co., 686 F.2d 578, 581-82 (7th Cir. 1982) (informing non-
parties of rights raises serious questions of judicial power); Pan Am. World Airways v.
United States Dist. Court, 523 F.2d 1073, 1077 n.3 (9th Cir. 1975) (sending notice is
contrary to power of judiciary; courts are powerless to act regarding persons not before
them); Baker v. Michie Co., 93 F.R.D. 494, 496 (W.D. Va. 1982) (notice constitutes
affirmative invitation to lawsuit, a nonjudicial function).
The above-cited courts appear to rely upon an anachronistic view of the trial court's
role, in which the lawsuit is party-initiated and party-controlled and the judge passively
arbitrates the interaction of the parties, waiting for all issues to be raised by the parties
before considering them. See Chayes, supra note 29, at 1283; cf Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 819 (1824) (judiciary has power to act only when
party submits proper subject to court), cited in Pan Am. World Airways v. United States
Dist. Court, 523 F.2d 1073, 1077 n.2 (9th Cir. 1975).
32. "A trial judge is not a mere moderator. He serves as a governor, obligated to see
that the law is properly administered." United States v. Baer, 575 F.2d 1295, 1301-02
(10th Cir. 1978); see Chayes, supra note 29, at 1302.
33. In re Air Crash Disaster at Fla. Everglades on Dec. 29, 1972, 549 F.2d 1006, 1012
n.8 (5th Cir. 1977); see also Manual for Complex Litigation § 1.10 (5th ed. 1982) (trial
judge has power and duty to control process of case; in complex cases, judge assumes
active role).
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ing on the customary choices of a party, as when a judge forces a plaintiff
to quit his suit and join another.34 Additionally, a court often continues
to supervise a party's conduct long after it issues a decree.35
Moreover, the recent revision of Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure36 demonstrates the current view that the court's role at the
pretrial stage should be broadened, not attenuated.37 In the interests of
fairness and efficiency, the trial judge is now expected to intervene per-
sonally at the pretrial stage, engaging in conduct formerly thought to be
appropriate only for the parties.38 Court authorization or sending of no-
tice to potential plaintiffs seems not inconsistent with these current no-
tions of judicial involvement that seek to promote efficiency and
fundamental fairness.
Because inviting potential plaintiffs to a suit may benefit plaintiffs or at
34. See Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044, 1049 (5th Cir. 1975)
(plaintiff required to drop suit and intervene in another), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944
(1976).
35. See North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 44 (1971) (discuss-
ing district court's supervisory role in achieving integration of school system); Chayes,
supra note 29, at 1298-1302 (through the ongoing affirmative conduct of some judicial
decrees, a trial judge functions like a policy planner and manager).
36. (a) . . . In any action, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys
for the parties and any unrepresented parties to appear before it for a conference
or conferences before trial for such purposes as
(1) expediting the disposition of the action;
(2) establishing early and continuing control so that the case will not be
protracted because of lack of management;
(3) discouraging wasteful pretrial activities;
(4) improving the quality of the trial through more thorough preparation,
and;
(5) . . . facilitating the settlement of the case ...
(c) . . . The participants at any conference under this rule may consider
and take action with respect to
(1) the formulation and simplification of the issues, including the elimina-
tion of frivolous claims or defenses;
(2) the necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings; ....
4) "• . the avoidance of unnecessary proof and of cumulative evidence;
(6) . the advisability of referring matters to a magistrate or master,
(7) the possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to
resolve the dispute;...
(10) . . . the need for adopting special procedures for managing potentially
difficult or protracted actions that may involve complex issues, multiple parties,
difficult legal questions, or unusual proof problems; and
(11) such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 16.
37. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(c) advisory committee note; 3 J. Moore, W. Taggart & J.
Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice 9 16.02, at 16-21 (1985); Pollack, Cutting the Fat From
Pretrial Proceedings, 97 F.R.D. 319, 326 (1983). See infra note 38 and accompanying
text.
38. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee note (introduction); Pollack, supra
note 37, at 319-20, 326 (1983); Comment, Recent Changes in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: Prescriptions to Ease the Pain?, 15 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 887, 890 (1984).
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least increase a defendant's liability, involvement in sending notice argua-
bly threatens the judge's impartiality or the appearance of that impartial-
ity.39 However, a judge's impartiality and the appearance of his
impartiality are not easily jeopardized.4" When a court sends or autho-
rizes notice, the judge supervises the format of the notice to assure that
the opt-in requirements are presented fairly.4 The judge does not deter-
mine the merits of the case; 2 she decides only that certain persons
should know about the suit.43 Court-issued or supervised notice would
not foster a judge's bias or prejudice toward either party.' Nor would
the appearance of a judge's propriety-to juries or recipients of notice-
be threatened.45 Juries remain unaware of notice proceedings and the
court can inform recipients that the notice does not constitute endorse-
ment of the merits of the action.46
39. See Dolan v. Project Constr. Corp., 725 F.2d 1263, 1268 (10th Cir. 1984); Woods
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 686 F.2d 578, 581 (7th Cir. 1982); Baker v. Michie Co., 93
F.R.D. 494, 496 (W.D. Va. 1982); see also Kaufman, supra note 29, at 692 (1980) (impar-
tial adjudication is the hallmark of a court). But see Shapiro, Judicial Independence: The
English Experience, 55 N.C.L. Rev. 577, 652 (1977) (viewing judicial independence as a
determinant of "courtness" oversimplifies the complex and ambiguous role of courts).
40. See infra note 44.
41. See Allen v. Marshall Field & Co., 93 F.R.D. 438, 445 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (plaintiffs
and defendants submit possible notice forms; judge modifies plaintiffs' form and autho-
rizes it; notice contains information regarding opt-in procedure and case); Riojas v. Seal
Produce, Inc., 82 F.R.D. 613, 620-22 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (plaintiff suggests notice format
and defendant is given time to object; notice enumerates opt-in requirements with basic
information about the case).
42. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974).
43. See Johnson v. American Airlines, 531 F. Supp. 957, 961, 966-67 (N.D. Tex.
1982). Indeed, the judge's involvement may favor neutral discussion of the issues. See
Allen v. Marshall Field & Co., 93 F.R.D. 438, 442 (N.D. II1. 1982) (quoting Monroe v.
United Air Lines, 90 F.R.D. 638, 640 (N.D. 11. 1981)).
44. Potentially compromising situations of a much more serious nature have been
held not to affect a judge's impartiality. For instance, a judge's neutral stance is not
necessarily threatened when one of those who supported him when he sought appoint-
ment litigates before the judge. See Warner v. Global Natural Resources PLC, 545 F.
Supp. 1298, 1300 (S.D. Ohio 1982). Nor does a judge's personal disapproval of policies
underlying the law he applies necessarily undermine his impartiality. See Southern Pac.
Communications Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 740 F.2d 980, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1359 (1985). Further, a judge does not lose his neutral stance,
either in fact or appearance, when he has a close relationship with a politician who was
investigated by a defendant in his legislative capacity, now appearing before the judge.
See In re United States, 666 F.2d 690, 696 (1st Cir. 1981). For further discussion of
unthreatened impartiality, see United States v. Gigax, 605 F.2d 507, 511 (10th Cir. 1979)
(dictum) (judge's ruling adverse to defendant does not establish judge's bias). For back-
ground, see Code of Judicial Conduct Canons 2 & 3; 13A C. Wright, A. Miller & E.
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3542 (1984); Frank, Commentary on Disquali-
fication of Judges-Canon 3C, 1972 Utah L. Rev. 377.
45. See supra note 44.
46. See Allen v. Marshall Field & Co., 93 F.R.D. 438, 450 (N.D. I11. 1982) (notice
included disclaimer: "No Opinion Expressed As To The Merits Of The Case"). The use
of such a disclaimer is common practice in Rule 23 class actions. 7A C. Wright & A.
Miller, supra note 10, § 1788, at 166-67.
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2. Sending Notice to Nonparties in the Absence of Congressional
Sanction: When is a Trial Court Justified?
Trial courts have broad discretionary powers regarding procedural as-
pects of litigation.47 Some courts assert, however, that court-issued or
authorized notice to nonparties lies beyond the sphere of judicial power
and is justified only when required by due process.48 Examination of
contexts in which the court has been held to have inherent power to issue
47. See 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1029, at 129
(1969).
The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1982), and Fed. R. Civ. P. 83 enable courts to
formulate rules and take certain steps that are not specified by Congress. The All Writs
Act constitutes a "'legislatively approved source of procedural instruments designed to
achieve 'the "rational ends of law.' '" United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S.
159, 172 (1977) (quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 299 (1969) (quoting Price v.
Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 282 (1948) (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317
U.S. 269, 273 (1942)))). Typically, the All Writs Act is invoked when the court's purpose
or effectiveness would otherwise be frustrated. United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434
U.S. 159, 173 (1977). Litigants in § 216(b) actions have invoked the All Writs Act as a
source of the court's power to send notice. See Woods v. New York Life Ins. Co., 686
F.2d 578, 581-82 (7th Cir. 1982). Indeed, one court, invoking the power provided in the
All Writs Act, has fashioned a procedure akin to Rule 23 where Rule 23 did not apply.
See United States ex rel. Sero v. Preiser, 506 F.2d 1115, 1125-26 (2d Cir. 1974) (habeas
corpus case in which court justified class action procedure because of inmates' illiteracy
and probable lack of relief without class action), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 921 (1975); see also
Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 299 (1969) (In some cases, "courts may fashion appropri-
ate modes of procedure, by analogy to existing rules or otherwise in conformity withjudicial usage."). The problem with invoking the All Writs Act as support for court
involvement in sending notice is that one still faces the question of whether sending or
authorizing notice is "in conformity with judicial usage," id.
Rule 83 has also been invoked by litigants as a source of power. See Pan Am. World
Airways v. United States Dist. Court, 523 F.2d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir. 1975). It provides
that district courts may "make and amend rules governing [their] practice not inconsis-
tent with [the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure]" and that "[i]n all cases not provided for
by rule, the district judges and magistrates may regulate their practice in any manner not
inconsistent with these rules." Fed. R. Civ. P. 83. The first part of Rule 83 grants
rulemaking power and the second part grants decisionmaking power. Note, Rule 83 and
the Local Federal Rules, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1251, 1252 (1967). A local court rule regard-
ing notice promulgated under the first part of Rule 83 might be inappropriate since the
determination of whether to send notice requires discretionary decisionmaking power of
the trial judge. Yet it is questionable whether the second sentence grants power that a
court would not already be regarded as having under the inherent powers doctrine. Cf
Flanders, Local Rules in Federal District Courts Usurpation, Legislation, or Information7,
14 Loy. L.A.L. Rev. 213, 220 (1981) (Rule 83 could be understood as a means for trial
courts to govern themselves under their inherent powers); Franquez v. United States, 604
F.2d 1239, 1244-45 (9th Cir. 1979). Further, invoking Rule 83 as a source of power still
requires determining whether court-sent or authorized notice comports with the role of
the judiciary, see Woods v. New York Life Ins. Co., 686 F.2d 578, 581-82 (7th Cir. 1982)
(Rule 83 cannot constitute source of power for nonjudicial function); Pan Am. World
Airways v. United States Dist. Court, 523 F.2d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 1975) (Rule 83 does
not constitute support for sending notice because court involvement in notice is contrary
to the judiciary's traditional role), and whether notice in ADEA class actions is inconsis-
tent with the spirit of the Federal Rules, see Zarate v. Younglove, 86 F.R.D. 80, 92-93
(C.D. Cal. 1980) (issue of consistency with federal rules may require determining policies
behind federal rules).
48. See, e.g., Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes, 564 F.2d 859, 863 (9th Cir. 1977); Baker
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notice to nonparties when due process was not at issue demonstrates the
error of this conclusion. 9
v. Michie Co., 93 F.R.D. 494, 495 (W.D. Va. 1982); Roshto v. Chrysler Corp., 67 F.R.D.
28, 29 (E.D. La. 1975).
In Roshto, the court suggested that although notice to potential plaintiffs would invari-
ably have the effect of informing persons of their rights, a court may not justify sending
notice to achieve that purpose. 67 F.R.D. at 29. The court did not explain why such a
purpose is beyond the scope of the judiciary. Id. The court's suggestion, nevertheless,
has dubious merit. Sending notice is procedural conduct, albeit with substantive over-
tones, and is thus subject to legislative review. See infra note 49. A court therefore has
the power to invoke bona fide justifications to send notice. Cf Cover, For James Wil.
Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 Yale L.J. 718, 736 (1975) (courts
should use their remedial powers lying outside the Federal Rules to engage in procedural
conduct as long as they articulate their substance-oriented justification for a power's use;
if necessary, Congress can correct the court); Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control
Over Judicial Rule-making: A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1,
14-18 (1958) (procedural issues with a radical impact on society should be left to the
courts, subject to legislative review). Nor should the court wait for legislative approval
before engaging in procedural conduct, for the legislature may never act. Cf. G. Cala-
bresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 8-15 (1982) (describing legislative inertia);
Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking-Judges Who Can't and Legislators Who Won't, 63
Colum. L. Rev. 787, 793-94 (1963) (describing Congress' failure to move promptly to
resolve ambiguities in the law). Rather, in the absence of explicit congressional direc-
tives, the courts should not hesitate to adopt their own procedural provisions. See
Chayes, supra note 29, at 1314 (Congress often articulates only general objectives and
orientation, leaving details to judicial discretion); Levin & Amsterdam, supra, at 36-39,
42 (courts should have the initiative regarding procedure that is subject to legislative
review); Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 36
(1985) (courts create collateral rules, in the absence of congressional ones, to help achieve
Congress' intentions); see also Vairo, Multi-Tort Cases: Cause for More Darkness on the
Subject, or a New Role for Federal Common Law?, 54 Fordham L. Rev. 167, 199 (1985)
(until Congress acts explicitly, courts have power to create applicable rules) (discussing
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972)).
49. The concept of "inherent powers" is not altogether clear or precise. See Frank-
furter & Landis, supra note 28, at 1022-23 (1924); Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate
Pretrial Discovery, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 480, 485 (1958) (referring to the "shadowy con-
cept" of inherent power) (quoting Comm. on Admin. of Justice of the St. Bar of Cal.,
Rep., 31 Cal. St. B.J. 204, 206 (1956)). One court has articulated three types of inherent
powers. The first type encompasses powers so essential to the function of courts as courts
that to eliminate them and still "conceive of courts is a self-contradiction." See Eash v.
Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 562 (3rd Cir. 1985) (en banc) (quoting Frankfurter
& Landis, supra note 28, at 1023). Congress is powerless to infringe on this class of
inherent powers. Eash, 757 F.2d at 562. For example, Congress could not pass a statute
forbidding the courts to engage in any textual interpretation, since that is the basic func-
tion of a court. See Merrill, supra note 48, at 28 n.118 (the judicial power includes the
power "to say what the law is") (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137,
177 (1803)). The second type comprises those powers arising from a court's nature, "nec-
essary to the exercise of all others." Eash, 757 F.2d at 562 (quoting Roadway Express,
Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1979) (quoting United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 32, 34 (1812))). Congress may not abrogate this power or render it practically
inoperative. See Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 65-66 (1924) (Congress may
not abrogate court's inherent power to punish contempt). An example is the contempt
sanction. Eash, 757 F.2d at 562-63. The third type consists of those powers necessary to
courts in the sense of being practically useful. Id. at 563. These are powers that Congress
may deny, but the courts may use them without congressional directive. See Eash, 757
F.2d at 563. They are sometimes referred to as equitable powers. See Hall v. Cole, 412
U.S. 1, 5 (1973); ITT Community Dev. Corp. v. Barton, 569 F.2d 1351, 1359 (5th Cir.
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a. The Inherent Power of the Court to Issue Notice in Class Actions
Under the 1938 Version of Rule 23
In contending that notice is proper only when due process is at issue,
courts confuse the mandatory notice provision of Rule 23 with the dis-
cretionary notice powers of a trial court.50 Some courts state that under
Rule 23(b)(3), notice is required because of the binding effect of the judg-
ment on all those defined within the class.5' However, it is illogical to
assume that because notice is required in the presence of one factor, it is
necessarily prohibited in the absence of that factor.
Indeed, Rule 23(d)(2), providing for notice when the court deems it
appropriate,52 codifies the court's inherent power to administer fairly and
efficiently the action before it through orders it considers appropriate. 3
This inherent power existed under the 1938 version of Rule 23, which
encompassed the "spurious" class suit, the historical analogue of the sec-
tion 216(b) class action.54 The spurious suit, like the class action under
modem Rule 23(b)(3), was brought by plaintiffs whose rights were af-
fected by common questions of law and fact.55 However, class members
1978). Since sending notice is considered an equitable court power, see Spahn, supra note
5, at 142, and is not absolutely essential for a court's function as a court or necessary for
exercising all other powers, it should be classified as among the third category of inherent
powers.
The importance of the inherent powers concept in this analysis is its reflection of proce-
dural custom and practice that courts engaged in without congressional sanction.
50. See Spalhn, supra note 5, at 142. For a case that properly distinguishes discretion-
ary and required notice power, see Monroe v. United Air Lines, 90 F.RLD. 638, 639 & n.3
(1981).
51. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
52. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2).
53. See 7A C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 10, § 1794, at 211; Miller, Problems of
Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 299, 313 (1972).
54. See infra notes 57 and 104.
Professor J. William Moore, drafter of the 1938 version of Rule 23, noted that express
provisions for notice were unnecessary since a court already possessed power to send
notice to absent parties. See 3B J. Moore & J. Kennedy, Moore's Federal Practice Ir
23.01[6] (2d ed. 1985) (commenting on Proposed Amendment of 1955 to Rule 23, re-
printed in 3B J. Moore & J. Kennedy, supra, 23.01[4]).
55. 7 C. Wright and A. Miller, supra note 10, § 1752.
The spurious suit was one of the three types of class actions under the 1938 version of
Rule 23. Each type was defined by the nature of the right that was sought to be enforced
for or against the class. See 3B J. Moore & J. Kennedy, supra note 54, c 23.01[l.-1](reprinting 1938 version of Rule 23). The three types came to be known as "true" (in-
volving a "joint" right), "hybrid" (involving specific property) and "spurious" (involving
common questions of law or fact). See 7 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 10, § 1752.
Attempts to pigeonhole class actions into one or more of the three categories resulted in
widespread confusion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee note; 7 C. Wright & A.
Miller, supra note 10, § 1753, at 538-40; Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Commit-
tee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 Harv. L. Rev. 356,
362 (1967); cf. Keeffe, Levy & Donovan, Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 Cornell L.Q. 327, 336
(1948) (distinction between hybrid and spurious class action is a "will o' the wisp").
Since "similarly situated" employees in § 216(b) suits do not have a joint interest and the
action does not involve specific property, the common question requirement of the
"spurious" class action remained the only suitable candidate for analogy. See 3B J.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
in the spurious suit, unlike in modem Rule 23(b)(3), were bound only if
they opted in.16 Nevertheless, courts required that notice be sent to po-
tential plaintiffs in spurious class suits,57 and the advisory committee for
modem Rule 23 affirmed the exercise of that power.58
The Seventh Circuit has distinguished the court's power to issue notice
under section 216(b) from that under Rule 23 by noting that in Rule 23
suits the court issues notice to parties, while in section 216(b) suits the
recipients are not parties until they have opted in. 9 This hypertechnical
distinction is not dispositive of the court's role. First, a trial court has
the inherent power to send notice to nonparties.6 ° Further, in the spuri-
ous action, potential class members were not considered parties, 6' yet
notice was nevertheless sent to them.62
b. The Inherent Power of the Court to Issue Notice
to Necessary Parties
The "necessary party" is an absentee having some interest in a case
whose presence in a lawsuit is desirable to protect the court's interest in
avoiding multiple lawsuits, the parties' interest in receiving complete jus-
tice or the absentee's interest in not being adversely affected by the out-
come of the suit, whether by stare decisis or other practical factors.63
Moore & J. Kennedy, supra note 54, 1 23.10[4] (2d ed. 1985). However, interpreting the
§ 216(b) class action as a spurious one was not so much an inevitable occurrence as it was
the result of courts' caution and confusion regarding § 216(b). See Foster, infra note 72,
at 324, 326; see also Poole, Private Litigation Under the Wage and Hour Act, 14 Miss. L.J.
157, 167 (1942) (§ 216(b) actions are broader than traditional class actions) (quoting
Shain v. Armour & Co., 40 F. Supp. 488, 489 (W.D. Ky. 1954)).
56. See All Am. Airways v. Elderd, 209 F.2d 247, 248 (2d Cir. 1954); 7 C. Wright &
A. Miller, supra note 10, § 1752, at 526 (spurious action had no binding affect on un-
named persons).
57. See, e.g., Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 567, 588-89
(10th Cir. 1961), cert. dismissed, 371 U.S. 801 (1962); Dickinson v. Burnham, 197 F.2d
973, 978-79 (2d Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 875 (1952); Derdiarian v. Futter-
man Corp., 38 F.R.D. 178, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). For cases that question the propriety of
court involvement in the notice process, see Cherner v. Transitron Elec. Corp., 201 F.
Supp. 934, 935-37 (D. Mass. 1962) (although court has power to send notice to potential
plaintiffs, in securities case notice would be inconsistent with Congress' intent, would
probably not result in the joinder of additional claims and would put court in role of
social agency); Baim & Blank, Inc. v. Warren-Connelly Co., 19 F.R.D. 108, 111
(S.D.N.Y. 1956) (where potential plaintiffs have no common questions of law or fact
affecting their rights, court should not notify them of pending action). In 1909, T.A.
Street-the man who coined the much maligned term "spurious suit"-described the
desirability of sending notice in spurious suits. See 1 T.A. Street, Federal Equity Practice
§ 552 (1909).
58. The advisory committee cited Oppenheimer v. F.J. Young & Co., 144 F.2d 387
(2d Cir. 1944), a case involving a spurious action, as an instance in which notice to poten-
tial plaintiffs would be appropriate to allow them to intervene. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(d)(2) advisory committee note.
59. See Woods v. New York Life Ins. Co., 686 F.2d 578, 582 (7th Cir. 1982).
60. See infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
61. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
62. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
63. See Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 129, 139 (1854); Fed. R. Civ. P. 19
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The trial court has inherent power to bring necessary parties before it,' a
power that is now codified and arguably legislatively sanctioned in Rule
19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.6
Bringing "necessary" parties before the court may involve sending no-
tice to them.6 Because the power to give notice to "necessary" parties is
considered "inherent," its exercise would be appropriate without legisla-
tive sanction.6 7 Two of the justifications for using this procedure-pro-
tecting the interests of absentees and avoiding circuitous and duplicative
litigation-are invoked by courts that direct notice in section 216(b) class
actions.68 Because neither of these justifications necessarily involve due
process concerns, 69 notice to nonparties need not be based solely on due
process requirements. Rather, notice is justified, even in the absence of
congressional sanction, when it may prevent multiple lawsuits or protect
the interests of absentees.70
Because a party characterized as "necessary" will always have some
interest in the lawsuit, it could be argued that the necessary party's inter-
advisory committee note; see also United States v. Dovolis, 105 F. Supp. 914, 916 (D.
Minn. 1952) (absentee should be allowed to join suit to avoid circuitous litigation and in
interests of fairness).
64. See Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 403 (1946); see also Mallow v.
Hinde, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 193, 197 (1827) (court has discretion to require plaintiff to
bring before it any party with an interest in the action, no matter how remote).
65. Rule 19 reads in pertinent part:
A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive
the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a
party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded
among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject
of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence
may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest
or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of
incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of
his claimed interest.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a). The 1966 revision of Rule 19 emphasizes pragmatic considerations
rather than formalistic categorization of the parties. See 7 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra
note 10, § 1601.
The Federal Rules receive indirect legislative sanction because, although promulgated
by the Advisory Committee under the Supreme Court's authority, they are presented to
Congress, which has 90 days to reject them before they become law. See Rules Enabling
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982). The extent to which Congress' sanction can be inferred
from this procedure is disputed. See infra note 81.
66. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 232-33 (1938); Fed. R. Civ.
P. 19(c) advisory committee note.
67. See supra note 49.
68. See Braunstein v. Eastern Photographic Laboratories, Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d
Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (notice should be sent to avoid a multiplicity of suits), cert. de-
nied, 441 U.S. 944 (1979); Johnson v. American Airlines, 531 F. Supp. 957, 960-61 (N.D.
Tex. 1982) (notice informs absentees of rights and avoids multiple lawsuits); Riojas v.
Seal Produce, Inc., 82 F.R.D. 613, 619 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (notice justified by fairness to
absentees). But see Baker v. Michie Co., 93 F.R.D. 494, 496 (W.D. Va. 1982) (not send-
ing notice might promote judicial economy: fewer claims would be brought).
69. In some cases, the court's failure to protect absentees may result in a violation of
due process. See 7 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 10, § 1602, at 20.
70. See supra note 68.
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est is more substantial than that of a similarly situated potential plaintiff
in a section 216(b) class action. According to this view, the more tenu-
ous interest removes the absentee from the sphere of the court's influence
in the section 216(b) suit and renders the court's notice powers in the
necessary party context inapplicable.71
The interests of absentees in section 216(b) suits are nevertheless sub-
stantial. First, if the plaintiffs lose, absentees are unlikely to bring a sec-
ond suit.72 Such a result has long been recognized as a proper subject for
court consideration when it renders a ruling.73 Given the expansion of
the availability of the lawsuit, as exemplified by the relaxed requirements
for standing,74 the flexibility of the Federal Rules7" and the modem view
that it is desirable to allow most persons into a lawsuit whose interests
will be significantly affected by it,76 this justification appears well within
the purview of the courts. Second, even if the first plaintiffs prevail and a
second group has not intervened before judgment,77 the claims of the
second group may be too small to warrant a fresh suit.78 Thus absentees
are often effectively precluded from raising their claims. Providing small
claimants with the practical ability to vindicate their rights is more diffi-
cult to characterize as belonging either to the judiciary or legislature.
This justification is one of the principal rationales behind the modem
class action.79 Nevertheless, it is unclear whether the judiciary may in-
71. Cf Woods v. New York Life Ins. Co., 686 F.2d 578, 582 (7th Cir. 1982) (court
communication with nonparties exceeds scope of judicial power).
72. See Foster, Jurisdiction, Rights, and Remedies for Group Wrongs Under the Fair
Labor Standards Act: Special Federal Questions, 1975 Wis. L. Rev. 295, 330-31; Com-
ment, The Spurious Class Suit: Procedural and Practical Problems Confronting Court and
Counsel, 53 Nw. U.L. Rev. 627, 633 (1958).
73. See Bourdieu v. Pacific W. Oil Co., 299 U.S. 65, 70 (1936) ("The rule is that if the
merits of the cause may be determined without prejudice to the rights of necessary par-
ties, absent and beyond the jurisdiction of the court, it will be done; and a court of equity
will strain hard to reach that result."); All Am. Airways v. Elderd, 209 F.2d 247, 248 (2d
Cir. 1954); Chayes, supra note 29, at 1289 (the interest required for joinder was defined
narrowly at first; liberalization of the requisite interest was due to awareness of judg-
ment's effects beyond the parties). See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text, infra
notes 109-15 and accompanying text.
74. See Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 Yale L.J.
1363, 1381-83 (1973); see also United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14 (1973)
("an identifiable trifle is enough for standing") (quoting Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and
Others, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 601, 613 (1968)).
75. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 ("[The Rules] shall be construed to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action."); 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 47,
§ 1029 (1969).
76. See Chayes, supra note 29, at 1310.
77. Notice may provide parties impetus to intervene before judgment. See infra notes
115-21.
78. If potential plaintiffs are unaware of a first suit, they could not have easily joined
it, and thus might be permitted to use offensive collateral estoppel in a subsequent suit.
Cf Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979) (despite trial court's broad
discretion, it should not allow use of offensive collateral estoppel when plaintiff could
easily have joined earlier action). Even with this increased chance of a favorable ruling,
however, the second group's claims may still be too small to warrant suit.
79. See Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338 & n.9 (1980) (central
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yoke it in the absence of Congress' express approval,"0 which is arguably
present in Rule 23.1 Therefore, examining whether section 216(b) and
the ADEA are congressional affirmances of this class action policy is
necessary to determine whether court notification of absentees is also jus-
tified on this ground.
B. Legislative Mandate: The Guidance Provided to the Trial Court by
the Three Acts Implicated in the ADEA Class Action
Having determined that court involvement in sending notice generally
conforms to the proper role of the trial court, an analysis of court power
next requires an assessment of congressional guidance regarding notice.
If the ADEA and the history of section 216(b) are interpreted as permit-
ting notice to potential class members, then the court may send or au-
concept of Rule 23 is to allow small-claim holders redress by permitting them to spread
the cost of litigation among other class members); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jaquelin, 417 U.S.
156, 185-86 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (class action provides recourse for
people with small claims); Welmaker v. W.T. Grant Co., 365 F. Supp. 531, 553 (N.D.
Ga. 1972) (class actions provide incentive to bring small claims that would otherwise be
impracticable to sue on); Berry, Ending Substance's Indenture to Procedure: The Impera-
tive for Comprehensive Revision of the Class Damage Action, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 299, 299
(1980); Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 4, at 685 & n.5 (1941); Yeazell, From Group
Litigation to Class Action Part I: The Industrialization of Group Litigation, 27 UCLA L
Rev. 514, 519-20 (1980); Note, The Cost-Internalization Case for Class Actions, 21 Stan.
L. Rev. 383, 419 (1969).
80. This is because this justification does not appear to have been widely invoked
before the 1938 version of Rule 23. Instead, the pre-1938 commentators described the
purposes of the class action as convenience and preventing a multiplicity of lawsuits. See
Blume, The "Common Questions" Principle in the Code Provision for Representative Suits,
30 Mich. L. Rev. 878, 889 (1932); Lesar, Class Suits and the Federal Rules, 22 Minn. L.
Rev. 34, 35, 51 (1937); Wheaton, Representative Suits Involving Numerous Litigants, 19
Corn. L.Q. 399, 401-02 (1934). Thus it cannot be definitively stated whether absent the
modem rules a court would have inherent power to send notice for the purpose of provid-
ing small claimants with a means to sue. Indeed, one commentator has stated that this
justification is invalid even under Rule 23(b)(3) because it serves an essentially legislative
purpose and is not for the judiciary to invoke. See Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and
Legalized Theft Consumer Class Actions and the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 842, 859-60 (1974).
81. Congressional sanction of Rule 23(b)(3) as a procedure providing redress for
small claimants is questionable. First, it is doubtful whether Congress' failure to reject
Rule 23 when the Supreme Court presented it with the Rule, see Rules Enabling Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (1982), should be interpreted as approval. See Burbank, The Rules En-
abling Act of 1934, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1015, 1102 (1982). Moreover, the Advisory Com-
mittee did not clearly articulate providing redress for small claimants as a purpose of the
1966 version of Rule 23. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee note; Landers,
supra note 80, at 846-47. Although since the promulgation of Rule 23(b)(3) the Supreme
Court and many commentators have viewed one of its purposes as providing small claim-
ants with redress, it would be a strange method of interpretation that would view such
post facto articulations of policy by the judiciary and others as representative of the legis-
lative will. Cf Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 18 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing) ("Plainly the Rules are not acts of Congress and can not be treated as such. Having
due regard to the mechanics of legislation and the practical conditions surrounding the
business of Congress when the Rules were submitted, to draw any inference of tacit ap-
proval from non-action by Congress is to appeal to unreality.")
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thorize notice to further the substantive aims of the ADEA.8 2 If,
however, they are read as reflecting congressional disparagement of an
affirmative court role in the notice procedure, as some courts contend,
8 3
then the court lacks the power to send or authorize notice.
1. The ADEA and Its Incorporation of Section 216(b)
The drafters of the ADEA were concerned with offering aggrieved
parties effective procedures to enforce the Act.84 Because 216(b) was
suitable for aggregating small claims of aggrieved employees,85 and be-
cause the FLSA contained both public and private enforcement mecha-
nisms,8 6 the use of the FLSA's provisions suited the ADEA's remedial
purposes.
Nevertheless, some courts insist that not using Rule 23 and its explicit
notice provisions reflects the ADEA's drafters' implicit disapproval of a
court role in sending notice to potential plaintiffs.8" When the ADEA
was drafted, however, that role was not extensively questioned. 88
Few cases had discussed the issue, and of these, most approved of a
court role or at least upheld the court's power to give notice.89 Further,
Rule 23(c) concerned mandatory notice; it did not address the court's
discretionary power to give notice. The section 216(b) class action did
not require mandatory notice because of section 216(b)'s opt-in require-
ment.9 ° Thus, the drafters of the ADEA had no reason to include an
explicit notice provision. Congress' silence, therefore, should not be in-
terpreted as disapproval of notice.9"
82. See Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 99 F.R.D. 89, 93 (D.N.J. 1983), appeal dismissed,
747 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1984).
83. See Dolan v. Project Constr. Corp., 725 F.2d 1263, 1267 (10th Cir. 1984) (Con-
gress limited role of court in section 216(b) actions through the Portal-to-Portal Act);
Baker v. Michie Co., 93 F.R.D. 494, 495-97 (W.D. Va. 1982) (if Congress intended provi-
sions of Rule 23 to be used by courts, it would have provided that Rule 23 be used in
section 216(b) actions); McGinley v. Burroughs Corp., 407 F. Supp. 903, 911 (E.D. Pa.
1975) (same).
84. See 113 Cong. Rec. 34,749 (1967) (statement of Rep. Halpern) ("[M]ost impor-
tantly, [the ADEA] gives the aggrieved persons ... just and adequate channels to en-
force the provisions of the bill.").
85. See infra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 3-4. See also 113 Cong. Rec. 34,748 (1967) (statement of Rep.
Dent) (the enforcement provisions of the FLSA were chosen instead of the NLRB
approach).
87. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. Rule 23 was promulgated in 1966 and
the ADEA was drafted in 1967. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23; 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-64 (1982).
88. Cf Spahn, supra note 5, at 140 (notice much more important in ADEA cases
than in other § 216(b) cases).
89. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
90. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982). See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
91. See Braunstein v. Eastern Photographic Laboratories, Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d
Cir. 1978) (per curiam), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 944 (1979); cf Transamerica Mortgage
Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18 (1979) (Congress' silence regarding private rem-
edy should not necessarily be interpreted as disparagement of private remedy); Porter v.
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2. The Portal-to-Portal Act's Amendment of Section 216(b) of the
Fair Labor Standards Act
The Portal-to-Portal Act of 194792 amended section 216(b) of the
FLSA by eliminating the "representative" action-brought by a plaintiff
with no stake in the action-and requiring the plaintiff in the "collective"
action-brought by interested parties similarly situated to each other-to
opt in to the lawsuit.93 Some courts have interpreted these changes and
comments of the drafters as demonstrating congressional disparagement
of the section 216(b) class action and an intent to curtail the court's role
in such actions.94
Some courts, apparently believing "representative action" to be synon-
ymous with "class action," interpret a heading entitled "Representative
Actions Banned" appearing in the PPA as a pejorative reference to all
class actions under section 216(b).15 These courts forget that the PPA
left intact what the drafters called the "collective" suit.9 6 In fact, the
PPA's drafters explicitly noted that the amendment was not intended to
affect the more important "collective" class action.97 Because very few
"representative" actions were actually brought,9" Congress' elimination
of the "representative" action had little practical effect on the impact of
section 216(b).
Courts also mistakenly construe the PPA's drafters' concern with bur-
densome discovery as applicable to plaintiffs' requests for names and ad-
dresses of similarly situated employees in the modem section 216(b) class
action.99 In various comments, the drafters of the PPA referred to the
Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946) (it is assumed that a court has the full
panoply of its equitable powers unless expressly restricted by Congress).
92. Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, ch. 52, 61 Stat. 84 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-262
(1982)).
93. See 93 Cong. Rec. 2182 (1947) (statement of Sen. Donnell). The "representative"
action was eliminated because the drafters of the PPA thought it facilitated coercive ac-
tions not brought in "good faith." Id
94. See Dolan v. Project Constr. Corp., 725 F.2d 1263, 1267 (10th Cir. 1984); Goerke
v. Commercial Contractors & Supply Co., 600 F. Supp. 1155, 1157-60 (N.D. Ga. 1984);
see also McKenna v. Champion Int'l Corp., 747 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1984) (purpose
of the PPA to limit § 216(b) actions).
95. Dolan v. Project Constr. Corp., 725 F.2d 1263, 1267 (10th Cir. 1984); Goerke v.
Commercial Contractors & Supply Co., 600 F. Supp. 1155, 1157 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
96. See 93 Cong. Rec. 2182 (1947) (statement of Sen. Donnell); see also Woods v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 686 F.2d 578, 581 (7th Cir. 1982) (bona fide class action proce-
dure still intact after PPA amendment of § 216(b)).
97. See 93 Cong. Rec. 2182 (1947) (statement of Sen. Donnell).
98. Cf Herman, The Administration and Enforcement of the Fair Labor Standards
Act, 6 Law & Contemp. Probs. 368, 385-86 (1939) (labor unions, the most suitable repre-
sentative plaintiffs, were wary of bringing § 216(b) suits). Additionally, private suits
played a comparatively unimportant role. See Foster, supra note 72, at 310 (public en-
forcement of the FLSA was more important than private enforcement under § 216(b)).
99. See Dolan v. Project Constr. Corp., 725 F.2d 1263, 1265, 1267 (10th Cir. 1984);
Goerke v. Commercial Contractors & Supply Co., 600 F. Supp. 1155, 1157 & n.2 (N.D.
Ga. 1984).
The disputed comment is as follows:
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excessively detailed and costly records employers would be responsible
for if the PPA was not passed."° But the drafters did not oppose the
discovery of normally maintained records.01 Since employers normally
keep records of employees' names and addresses, these comments do not
apply to plaintiffs' requests in the modem ADEA class action.
Finally, and most importantly, some courts contend that the opt-in
requirement added to section 216(b) by the PPA was intended both to
restrict the scope of and curtail the court's role in section 216(b) class
actions. 102
As noted, plaintiffs in the spurious class suit under the 1938 version of
Rule 23 were not bound by a judgment unless they individually con-
sented to be joined.1 °3 The section 216(b) collective action had been
analogized to and was referred to by courts as a spurious class action. 104
Thus, in section 216(b) class actions, plaintiffs already had to opt in to be
The procedure in these suits follows a general pattern. A petition is filed
under section 16(b) by one or two employees in behalf of many others. To this
is [sic] attached interrogatories calling upon the employer to furnish specific
information regarding each employee during the entire period of employment.
The furnishing of this data alone is a tremendous financial burden to the
employer.
H.R. Rep. No. 71, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 4, reprinted in 1947 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1029,
1032.
100. See Woods v. New York Life Ins. Co., 686 F.2d 578, 581 (7th Cir. 1982); H.R.
Rep. No. 71, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4, reprinted in 1947 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1029,
1032.
The chief purpose of the Portal-to-Portal Act was to eliminate recovery allowed under
a series of Supreme Court decisions, see Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S.
680, 691-92 (1946); Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers,
325 U.S. 161, 166 (1945); Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321
U.S. 590, 598 (1944), for back wages under the FLSA for time spent traveling within the
workplace. See Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, ch. 52, 61 Stat. 84, 84 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 251-262 (1982)). The drafters of the PPA made clear that their concern regarding
burdensome discovery extended to the kind of situation involved in Anderson v. Mt.
Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946). See H.R. Rep. No. 71, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
2-4, reprinted in 1947 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1029, 1030-31. An example of such burden-
some discovery consisted of requests for 4,123,050 items regarding starting and quitting
times, total hours and overtime hours worked, and hours shown on employees' time
cards. H.R. Rep. No. 71, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4, reprinted in 1947 U.S. Code Cong.
Serv. 1029, 1032; see also 93 Cong. Rec. 2180 (1947) (statement of Sen. Donnell) (refer-
ring to unfairness of having employers keep records of such things as how long it took
employees to walk to work stations, to tape their arms or to don their overalls).
101. Senator Donnell, Chairman of the Senate committee responsible for the PPA,
explicitly stated that the drafters had no objection to the discovery of records kept by an
employer. See 93 Cong. Rec. 2180 (1947).
102. See McKenna v. Champion Int'l Corp., 747 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1984)
(PPA and its opt-in requirement had effect of limiting FLSA); Dolan v. Project Constr.
Corp., 725 F.2d 1263, 1267 (10th Cir. 1984) (opt-in requirement demonstrates congres-
sional intent to remove court from active role in § 216(b) actions); Goerke v. Commercial
Contractors & Supply Co., 600 F. Supp. 1155, 1159, 1160 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (same).
103. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
104. See Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851, 853 (3d Cir. 1945) (classifying
§ 216(b) proceeding as spurious suit); Schempf v. Armour & Co., 5 F.R.D. 294, 296 (D.
Minn. 1946) (same).
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bound by the court's judgment before the PPA added an explicit opt-in
requirement. 05 Therefore, the PPA only codified what was already
practice, making suits under section 216(b) expressly analogous to spuri-
ous suits under the 1938 version of Rule 23.106
Some courts viewed the spurious action as merely the equivalent of
permissive joinder, 107 already provided for in Rule 20.108 However, this
interpretation relegates the Rule 23 spurious action to the status of mere
redundancy. 109 According to a view more congruent with the purposes
of the FLSA, the spurious class action and its section 216(b) analogue
were procedures by which the court could take an active role in aiding
the public's interest in avoiding multiple lawsuits and the interests of
plaintiffs with small claims." 0 Under the FLSA, individual claims were
relatively small"' and often did not warrant bringing suit unless aggre-
gated with those of other persons.1 12 To foster the aggregation of claims,
section 216(b) functioned as an invitation to the lawsuit.1 3 The court
would therefore send notice to similarly situated potential plaintiffs.' 14
Thus, duplicative suits were avoided, and enforcement of the FLSA was
aided. By choosing to incorporate section 216(b) in the ADEA, the
ADEA's drafters afirmed this procedure. The trial court therefore is
justified in sending notice when it will aid small claimants to vindicate
their rights under the ADEA or otherwise further the aims of the
ADEA.
Indeed, notice to potential plaintiffs is often essential to further these
aims."' Because of the unaggressive stance of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission,' 16 charged with public enforcement of the
ADEA, the private suite under section 216(b) now plays the dominant
105. See Foster, supra note 72, at 327.
106. See Spahn, supra note 5, at 129.
107. See California Apparel Creators v. Wieder, Inc., 162 F.2d 893, 897 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 816 (1947); Saxton v. W.S. Askew Co., 35 F. Supp. 519, 521 (N.D. Ga.
1940); 7 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 10, § 1752, at 525.
108. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a).
109. See Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 4, at 699.
110. See Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851, 853 (3d Cir. 1945) (§ 216(b) action
empowers a collective lawsuit with the strength of collective bargaining); Schempf v. Ar-
mour & Co., 5 F.R.D. 294, 297-98 (D. Minn. 1946) (the FLSA mandates that every
opportunity be given to allow employees to join a § 216(b) action); Z. Chafee, Some
Problems of Equity 274-75 (1950); Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 4, at 685 n.5.
111. See, eg., Brooklyn Say. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 710 (1945) (upholding
recoveries of $423.16 and S 1002.10); Foster, supra note 72, at 332 (amounts of recoveries
are insufficient to make § 216(b) truly effective). See infra note 119.
112. See supra note 6.
113. See All Am. Airways v. Elderd, 209 F.2d 247, 248 (2d Cir. 1954); Z. Chafee,
supra note 110, at 275.
114. See Schempf v. Armour & Co., 5 F.R.D. 294, 297-98 (D. Minn. 1946); Timber-
lake v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 3 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 311, 313 (S.D. Iowa 1943).
115. See Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 99 F.R.D. 89, 93 (D.NJ. 1983), appeal dismissed,
747 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1984); Allen v. Marshall Field & Co., 93 F.R.D. 438, 442 (N.D. Ill.
1982).
116. See Spahn, supra note 5, at 121.
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role in the ADEA's enforcement. 11 7 Congress intended section 216(b) to
provide a strong deterrent to violations of the FLSA and the ADEA. I Is
Yet, perhaps because damage awards are limited under the ADEA,' 9
section 216(b) does not appear effectively to deter discriminatory prac-
tices. 12 0 By apprising claimants of their rights when they are financially
able to act on them, notice can strengthen section 216(b)'s deterrent ef-
fect. Further, if notice is not sent to individual claimants, the factual and
legal issues particular to them may never be presented in court. Finally,
notice can help fulfill Congress' aim that employers not escape liability
because of employees' ignorance of their rights.'
2
'
II. CONCERNS REGARDING SOLICITATION OF CLAIMS AND
"STIRRING Up" LITIGATION
Some courts have refused to send or authorize notice to potential
117. See Schuster & Miller, An Empirical Assessment of the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act, 38 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 64, 70 (1984) (in survey of ADEA cases
through 1981, public actions accounted for only 26.8% of all ADEA suits).
118. See Brooklyn Say. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 710 (1945) (Congress clearly
intended § 216(b) to have a deterrent effect); S. Rep. No. 640, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 7
(greater power should be given to Department of Labor to discourage employers from
violating the FLSA), reprinted in 1949 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 2241, 2247-48.
119. Recovery under § 216(b) payment is for lost wages, which may be doubled ("liq-
uidated damages"). 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982). For ADEA purposes, these double dam-
ages are only available to plaintiffs who prove a willful violation. Id. § 626(b).
Compensatory damages for pain and suffering and punitive damages are held unavailable.
See, e.g., Pfeiffer v. Essex Wire Corp., 682 F.2d 684, 687-88 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1039 (1982); Fiedler v. Indianhead Truck Line, Inc., 670 F.2d 806, 809-10 (8th Cir.
1982); Naton v. Bank of Cal., 649 F.2d 691, 698-99 (9th Cir. 1981); Slatin v. Stanford
Research Inst., 590 F.2d 1292, 1296 (4th Cir. 1979); Dean v. American Sec. Ins. Co., 559
F.2d 1036, 1038-39 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Rogers v. Exxon
Research & Eng'g Co., 550 F.2d 834, 841-42 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022
(1978); see Note, Damages in Age Discrimination Cases-The Needfor a Closer Look, 17
U. Rich. L. Rev. 573, 587 (1983). Reinstatement may be an available remedy under the
Act, and when that is unavailable or inappropriate, awards of prospective wages ("front
pay") may be made. See Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 728 (2d Cir.
1984); EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225, 1232-33 (10th Cir.
1984), vacated on other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 896 (1985); Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co.,
695 F.2d 1093, 1100 (8th Cir. 1982). Contra Kolb v. Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869, 874-
75 & n.4 (1st Cir. 1982) (front pay should not be awarded). For background and further
discussion, see Note, Front Pay: A Necessary Alternative to Reinstatement Under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 53 Fordham L. Rev. 579 (1984).
120. See Note, Damages in Age Discrimination Cases-The Need for a Closer Look,
supra note 119, at 588 (ADEA cases have increased considerably in recent years, demon-
strating that age discrimination has not abated). Admittedly, the increase in ADEA liti-
gation may also be attributed to other factors. But, at the least, the increase in litigation
demonstrates that the purpose of the ADEA-the elimination of age discrimination-has
not been achieved.
121. See S. Rep. No. 640, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (Secretary of Labor notes that it is
against congressional purposes for employers to be relieved of liability on account of
employees' ignorance), reprinted in 1949 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 2241, 2247-48.
Ignorance of rights under the ADEA may be the result of employers' failure to post
information regarding those rights in the workplace. See Allen v. Marshall Field & Co.,
93 F.R.D. 438, 445 (N.D. I11. 1982).
19861 CLASS ACTION NOTICE UNDER THE ADEA 653
plaintiffs in ADEA class actions, regardless of their determination of the
power issue, because they believe that notice fosters the undesirable solic-
itation of claims and "stirs up" litigation. 22 Curiously, some of these
courts view the act of contacting potential plaintiffs by mail, even if per-
formed or supervised by the court, as fraught with the problems of in-
person solicitation.' 23 Because the Supreme Court has upheld blanket
bans on in-person solicitation by lawyers 24 and because some courts find
a substantial governmental interest in preventing stirring up litigation,
these courts also ban communication between plaintiffs' attorney and po-
tential plaintiffs. 125
A blanket prohibition on sending notice, which proposes a commercial
transaction, is analyzed according to first amendment standards for the
protection of commercial speech.126 Under the first amendment, com-
mercial speech receives less comprehensive protection than noncommer-
cial speech. 2 Because sending notice to potential plaintiffs is not
inherently misleading, a blanket ban on attorney communication is justi-
fied only if it furthers a substantial governmental interest by the least
restrictive means. 128 Analyzing whether soliciting clients or stirring up
litigation constitute substantial governmental interests that justify a ban
122. See McKenna v. Champion Int'l Corp., 747 F.2d 1211, 1215 (8th Cir. 1984);
Baker v. Michie Co., 93 F.R.D. 494, 496-97 (W.D. Va. 1982); Montalto v. Morgan Guar.
Trust Co., 83 F.RD. 150, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Roshto v. Chrysler Corp., 67 F.R.D. 28,
30 (E.D. La. 1975); accord Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes, 564 F.2d 859, 863 (9th Cir.
1977).
123. See McKenna v. Champion Int'l Corp., 747 F.2d 1211, 1216 (8th Cir. 1984) (at-
torney-sent notice like in-person solicitation); Baker v. Michie Co., 93 F.R.D. 494, 496
(W.D. Va. 1982) (notice, unlike advertising, focuses on a particular plaintiff in particular
litigation).
Courts often do not explain the difference between "stirring up litigation" and "solici-
tation of claims." See, e.g., Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes, 564 F.2d 859, 863 (9th Cir.
1977); Wagner v. Loew's Theatres, Inc., 76 F.R.D. 23, 25 (M.D.N.C. 1977); Roshto v.
Chrysler Corp., 67 F.R.D. 28, 30 (E.D. La. 1975). The phrase "stirring up litigation"
focuses on the effect of such litigation on courts and defendants, while "solicitation of
claims" focuses on the attorney-client relationship. See infra notes 130-57 and accompa-
nying text.
124. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978).
125. See McKenna v. Champion Int'l Co., 747 F.2d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 1984);
Roshto v. Chrysler Corp., 67 F.R.D. 28, 30 (E.D. La. 1975).
126. McKenna v. Champion Int'l Corp., 747 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1984); see
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265, 2275 (1985); Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 437-39 (1978).
If plaintiffs were represented by a nonprofit organization, devoted to advancing "beliefs
and ideas" through litigation, In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 423-24, 434 (1977) (quoting
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)), then notice would be analyzed according
to a stricter standard than that for commercial speech, id. at 437-38 & n.32; see also
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978); NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 429-30 (1963).
127. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265. 2274-75 (1985);
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1983); In re R.MJ., 455 U.S.
191, 203 (1982); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 562-63 (1980).
128. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265, 2277-78 (1985).
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on lawyer communication with potential ADEA plaintiffs also provides a
framework for determining whether they justify the trial court's refusal
of a role in sending notice. 129
A. Stirring Up Litigation
An initial question is whether inviting potential class members to an
ongoing lawsuit constitutes "stirring up litigation." If the litigation is
already under way, adding claims by sending notice does not stir up new
litigation; rather it broadens the scope of already existing litigation. 30
Indeed, when claims are added to a section 216(b) action, the net effect
may often be to decrease litigation, since many claims will be resolved at
one trial.13 1
Courts that invoke the "stirring up litigation" rationale imply that stir-
ring up litigation per se is an evil-presumably even for warranted
claims 32 -and also liken the effects of notice to barratry, champerty or
maintenance 133-age-old proscriptions aimed at preventing frivolous or
maliciously coercive suits.13 4
129. For cases that consider the Supreme Court's lawyer advertising cases relevant to
the non-first amendment determination of whether the court may take part in the notice
process, see Braunstein v. Eastern Photographic Laboratories, Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d
Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (citing Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), which forbade
blanket bans on lawyer advertising, as undercutting the rationale for a court's refusal to
send notice because notice would constitute "stirring up litigation"), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 944 (1979); Baker v. Michie Co., 93 F.R.D. 494, 496 (W.D. Va. 1982) (determined
issue of court involvement in part by comparing notice unfavorably to lawyer advertising
that had been upheld by the Supreme Court); Monroe v. United Air Lines, 90 F.R.D.
638, 640 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (Supreme Court ruling on lawyer advertising suggests that stir-
ring up litigation and soliciting clients do not pose serious problem in the notice context).
130. See Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 99 F.R.D. 89, 93 (D.N.J. 1983), appeal dismissed,
747 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1984).
131. Cf Braunstein v. Eastern Photographic Laboratories, Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d
Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (notice is justified by court's interest in avoiding multiple law-
suits), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 944 (1979); Allen v. Marshall Field & Co., 93 F.R.D. 438,
444 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (notice will aid judicial economy by minimizing the number of sepa-
rate actions); Johnson v. American Airlines, 531 F. Supp. 957, 959-60 (N.D. Tex. 1982)
(same); Monroe v. United Air Lines, 90 F.R.D. 638, 640 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (same). But see
Baker v. Michie Co., 93 F.R.D. 494, 497 (W.D. Va. 1982) (if potential plaintiffs await
outcome of suit, and original plaintiffs prevail, new suits will be brought by the potential
plaintiffs).
132. Cf Wagner v. Loew's Theatres, Inc., 76 F.R.D. 23, 25 (M.D.N.C. 1977) ("The
awakening of sleeping plaintiffs by either the plaintiff or the Court would fly in the teeth
of the centuries-old doctrine against the solicitation of claims.") (quoting Roshto v.
Chrysler Corp., 67 F.R.D. 28, 30 (E.D. La. 1975)).
133. See Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes, 564 F.2d 859, 863 (9th Cir. 1977) (citing Cali-
fornia statute proscribing barratry); Baker v. Michie Co., 93 F.R.D. 494, 495 (W.D. Va.
1982).
134. "[M]aintenance is helping another prosecute a suit; champerty is maintaining a
suit in return for a financial interest in the outcome; and barratry is a continuing practice
of maintenance or champerty." In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 424 n. 15 (1978); 4 W. Black-
stone, Commentaries *134-36. If viewed broadly, these traditional proscriptions would
include activities that are now recognized as legitimate, such as the contingency fee. See
Radin, Maintenance By Champerty, 24 Calif. L. Rev. 48, 69-72 (1935). Thus courts inter-
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The idea that instituting legitimate litigation constitutes an evil has
been rejected by the Supreme Court. 35 In Zauderer v. Office of Discipli-
nary Counsel,36 the Court expressed doubts that any governmental in-
terest is served when citizens' access to accurate information that may
lead them to vindicate their rights through legal action is impeded.' 37
The Court stated that promoting access to the courts is not "an evil to be
regretted; rather, it is an attribute of our system of justice in which we
ought to take pride."1 38
Regarding meritless or maliciously coercive suits, the section 216(b)
class action is not immune from being exploited for such unscrupulous
purposes. Such abuse, however, is not endemic only to lawyers in
ADEA class actions. In Zauderer, the Court acknowledged the potential
use of advertisements for bringing meritless or harassing suits., 39 Never-
theless, the Court stated that a blanket ban against such communications
was not necessary to achieve the state's interest in preventing such
suits. 4 Instead, the Court suggested that a less restrictive means to
achieve the state's goal would be to punish attorneys who bring meritless
or harassing suits."'
Sending notice to potential plaintiffs poses even fewer possibilities for
such problems than the type of advertisement addressed in Zauderer.
The Zauderer decision permits attorneys to solicit clients for particular
lawsuits through print advertising.'4 2 Although an advertisement might
be registered with the state bar association, 4 3 the court or state bar
might remain ignorant of the identities of individual clients garnered by a
pret these proscriptions as applying only to frivolous suits or suits brought only to harass.
See In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 436-37 (comparison to barratry, champerty or maintenance
inapposite where conduct was not maliciously inspired or served no public interest);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 439 (1963) ("Malicious intent was of the essence of the
common-law offenses of fomenting or stirring up litigation.") (footnote omitted); Radin,
supra, at 75, 77-78 (essence of champertous act is whether claim is meritless or purpose is
to extort money), cited in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. at 438 n.17.
135. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265, 2277-78 (1985)
(dictum).
136. 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985).
137. See id. at 2277-78 (dictum); see also Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 375-77, 376
n.32 (1977) (Court expressed concern that aggrieved individuals receive information
about their legal rights).
138. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265, 2278 (1985).
139. See Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2279 & n.12; Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 375
n.31 (1977). The Zauderer decision involved, inter alia, an advertisement directed at
women who had used the Dalkon Shield. See Zauderer at 2271-72. The plaintiffs' attor-
ney succeeded in procuring clients for a suit against the manufacturer. Id.
140. See id. at 2278-80.
141. See id. at 2279 n.12; see also In re Von Wiegen, 63 N.Y.2d 163, 174, 470 N.E.2d
838, 845, 481 N.Y.S.2d 40, 46 (1984) (communications that actually foment meritless
suits should be proscribed, unlike those communications that further legitimate informa-
tional function), cerL denied, 105 S. Ct. 2701 (1985).
142. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2280.
143. Cf In re Von Wiegen, 63 N.Y.2d 163, 175, 470 N.E.2d 838, 844, 481 N.Y.S.2d
40, 47 (1984) (discussing filing requirements for writings), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2701
(1985).
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particular ad. In contrast, the court in an ADEA suit will be aware of
potential plaintiffs who choose the attorney's services. The potential for
malicious suits would thus be no greater than in any other sort of litiga-
tion.44 Moreover, when a court decides a motion to give notice to po-
tential plaintiffs in an ADEA class action it determines whether the
recipients are "similarly situated," in effect deciding whether their join-
der is warranted.145 Thus it is unlikely that the claims added will be
meritless. Because the evils associated with stirring up litigation are no
more serious when notice is sent than those raised in Zauderer, and be-
cause the court may use the same less restrictive means of dealing with
them proposed in Zauderer,4 6 a blanket ban of notice based on prevent-
ing the stirring up of litigation should not stand.'
47
B. Client Solicitation
Courts next justify a ban on attorney-sent notice and court abstention
from involvement in sending notice by citing the undesirable effects of
client solicitation.' According to some courts, the recipient of a mailed
notice form, even a form scrutinized by a trial court, is subjected to the
same dangers that arise from in-person solicitation.
49
The Supreme Court has upheld bans against in-person solicitation by
lawyers because of the inherent potential for overreaching, invasion of
privacy and undue influence and because of the special regulatory
problems that in-person solicitation presents. 150 Like lawyer advertising
aimed at specific lawsuits and lawyer mailings of generalized informa-
144. Cf Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 375 n.31 (1977) (Court questions inevitable
relationship between advertising and dishonesty, noting that unethical lawyers will meet
with unethical clients regardless of restrictions. Thus a sanction should address fraud per
se, rather than unduly restricting legitimate activities.).
145. See Graffy v. Jewel Food Stores, No. 83C-9313, slip op. at - (N.D. I11. Oct. 29,
1985) (before granting notice in section 216(b) suit, court must first decide whether added
claims would be frivolous or insubstantial).
146. The court can impose sanctions, see Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,
105 S. Ct. 2265, 2279 n. 12 (1985), such as those under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Cf. Tedesco v. Mishkin, No. 82-8753, slip op. at 29-31 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
25, 1986) (in class action, judge fined defendant attorney more than $76,000 for making
false and misleading communications with plaintiff class members).
147. Cf Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. at 2279 n. 12 (mere
possibility that communication will result in stirring up meritless litigation does not sus-
tain blanket ban on that communication where state can assess validity of attorney adver-
tising without great difficulty).
148. See McKenna v. Champion Int'l Corp., 747 F.2d 1211, 1215-17 (8th Cir. 1984);
Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes, 564 F.2d 859, 863 (9th Cir. 1977); Roshto v. Chrysler
Corp., 67 F.R.D. 28, 30 (E.D. La. 1975).
149. See McKenna v. Champion Int'l Corp., 747 F.2d 1211, 1216-17 (8th Cir. 1984);
see also Baker v. Michie Co., 93 F.R.D. 494, 496 (W.D. Va. 1982) (notice focuses on
particular plaintiff in particular lawsuit).
150. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 464-66 (1978); see also
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265, 2277 (1985) (discussing
Ohralik Court's reasoning).
1986] CLASS ACTION NOTICE UNDER THE ADEA 657
tion, which the Supreme Court has held may not be banned outright,'5 '
notice of ADEA actions does not present these problems. The typical
notice to a potential plaintiff is unlikely to invade the recipient's pri-
vacy.1 52 It is an announcement of rights and services, without explicit or
extensive reference to the recipient's particular situation. 53 Also, like
print advertising, the notice in letter form lacks the coercive aspect of a
personal encounter.'54 The recipient is free to act or refrain from acting
and can consult friends, family or another attorney before responding to
the letter. 55 The trial judge can require that notice contain the names of
other lawyers, with an explanation that the recipient is free to consult
any of the listed attorneys or one of the recipient's choosing." 6 Thus,
like print advertising, the letter is "more conducive to reflection and the
exercise of choice . . . than is personal solicitation by an attorney."', 57
Because letters designed to pressure the recipient can be dealt with on an
individual basis, a blanket ban on attorney-issued notice is not the least
restrictive means of preventing such attorney abuse, and thus should not
pass muster under the first amendment.
When a court issues notice, acting as a neutral arbiter, it is doubtful
the recipient will be misled or coerced.' 5 8 But even if notice is sent by
plaintiffs' attorneys, court supervision of the notice form can render in-
stances of such dangers highly improbable. Any potentially problematic
information can be expunged or altered by the court. 5 9 By supervising
the notice form, the court functions much like state entities in charge of
overseeing lawyer advertising." ° A court's involvement in sending no-
tice would therefore have a salutary influence on the notice procedure. 16'
151. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265, 2280 (1985) (law-
yer advertising aimed at specific lawsuit); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 206 (1982) (genera-
lized mailings).
152. See In re Von Wiegen, 63 N.Y.2d 163, 174, 470 N.E.2d 838, 844, 481 N.Y.S.2d
40, 46 (1984) (direct mail solicitation does not substantially invade privacy), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 2701 (1985).
153. There may be instances in which mail solicitation contains personal information
that might upset the recipient, unlike court-supervised notice. For instance, in Leoni v.
State Bar of California, 39 Cal. 3d 609, 704 P.2d 183, 185-86, 217 Cal. Rptr. 423, 425-26
(1985), appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 1170 (1986), the attorneys' letters referred to recipi-
ents' financial status and the status of litigation in which they were engaged.
154. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265, 2277 (1985); In re
Von Wiegen, 63 N.Y.2d 163, 174, 470 N.E.2d 838, 844, 481 N.Y.S.2d 40, 46 (1984), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 2701 (1985).
155. See supra note 154.
156. See Johnson v. American Airlines, 531 F. Supp. 957, 966 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
157. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265, 2277 (1985).
158. Cf Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 99 F.R.D. 89, 93 (D.N.J. 1983) (comparing court-
authorized notice to barratry is "silly"), appeal dismissed, 747 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1984).
159. See Allen v. Marshall Field & Co., 93 F.R.D. 438, 444-45 (N.D. ill. 1982) (court
modifies form of notice).
160. Cf. In re Von Wiegen, 63 N.Y.2d 163, 175, 470 N.E.2d 838, 845, 481 N.Y.S.2d
40, 47 (1984) (little chance of deception because of state's filing requirement), cert. de-
nied, 105 S. Ct. 2701 (1985).
161. See Foster, supra note 72, at 330 & n.121; Gordon, The Common Question Class
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Thus the government has no substantial interest in generally proscrib-
ing notice to potential plaintiffs. The putative evils of client solicitation
and stirring up litigation do not justify court rejection of an affirmative
role in the notice procedure. 162 The state and federal courts can punish
attorneys who actually send misleading or coercive communications, but
such occurrences are extremely unlikely when the court takes an affirma-
tive role. Because sending notice to potential plaintiffs does not present
the kinds of problems posed by in-person solicitation, the court is free to
send or supervise notice when it would advance the purposes of the
ADEA.
CONCLUSION
Court supervision or authorization of notice to potential plaintiffs
comports with a trial court's role. A court, therefore, does not need an
explicit directive from Congress to send or authorize notice. Congress'
silence regarding notice does not vitiate that power. On the contrary, by
choosing section 216(b), the ADEA's drafters endorsed the use of class
actions to aggregate small claims and thus implicitly sanctioned one of
the purposes of sending notice.
Analysis of the nature and purposes of notice reveals that comparisons
with in-person solicitation are inapposite. Further, because sending no-
tice to potential members of ADEA class actions serves to inform bona
Suit Under the Federal Rules and in Illinois, 42 Ill. L. Rev. 518, 532 (1947); Kaplan,
supra note 55, at 398-99.
162. Court restriction of communications between attorneys and potential plaintiffs
can be challenged on grounds other than the first amendment. In Gulf Oil Co. v. Ber-
nard, 452 U.S. 89 (1981), the Court ruled that possible abuses arising from lawyer contact
with class members in Rule 23 actions did not justify routine bans on such contact. See
id. at 104. The Court held that the purposes of the Federal Rules and especially of Rule
23 would be frustrated if limitations on communications between parties and potential
class members were not based on specific findings by the court that the limitations are
required. See id. at 101-02.
Gulf Oil has been held inapplicable by lower courts to § 216(b) class actions on the
grounds that potential plaintiffs in § 216(b) suits do not possess the same due process
rights as Rule 23 class members, see McKenna v. Champion Int'l Corp., 747 F.2d 1211,
1215-16 n.5 (8th Cir. 1984), and that the Court in GulfOil was not faced with solicitation
problems because plaintiffs were represented by the NAACP, see McKenna v. Champion
Int'l Corp., 747 F.2d 1211, 1216 n.5 (8th Cir. 1984). However, the Gulf Oil Court was
concerned with interference with the policies behind Rule 23. To a large extent those
same policies are embodied in § 216(b) class actions. See supra notes 109-11 and accom-
panying text. Moreover, the solicitation problems in § 216(b) class actions are not partic-
ularly important when the court supervises notice. See supra notes 148-61 and
accompanying text. Restrictions on lawyer communications in Rule 23 actions are aimed
at particular abuses, such as attempts by defendants to obtain repudiations of named
plaintiffs' counsel and communications regarding fees, see Manual for Complex Litiga-
tion § 1.41 & n.43 (5th ed. 1982). The court-supervised notice form could not be used for
such purposes. Thus a court should only base restriction of attorney communication
with potential plaintiffs in § 216(b) actions on specific findings of potential for abuses.
See Dolan v. Project Constr. Corp., 725 F.2d 1263, 1268 (10th Cir. 1984) (quoting Gulf
Oil v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 101 (1981)); Goerke v. Commercial Contractors & Supply
Co., 600 F. Supp. 1155, 1161 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (same).
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fide claimants of rights created by Congress, sending notice does not re-
semble the traditional evil of stirring up litigation. The trial court thus
may not prohibit communications of counsel with potential class mem-
bers. Instead, the court can minimize potential abuses of the notice pro-
cedure and further the aims of the ADEA by supervising notice to
"similarly situated" potential class members.
David Jon Wolfsohn

